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In Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.,' Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg wrote that federal trial judges must apply state law when a
jury's award of compensation is challenged as excessive or inade-
quate.2 Justice Ginsburg found that federal jury policy interests could
and should be accommodated with state law standardization of com-
pensation awards.3 What is surprising about Gasperini is that Justice
Ginsburg felt compelled to apply state law at all.4 In his dissent in
Gasperini, Justice Scalia forcefully points out that the proper roles of
judges and juries in the federal system are solely a matter of federal
law.5 Why Gasperini did not follow Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric
Cooperative' and Hanna v. Plumer' in applying only federal law re-
mains a mystery or a riddle.
Justice Ginsburg stretches out to include state law in Gasperini
when she writes that "[t]he Seventh Amendment, which governs pro-
ceedings in federal court, but not in state court .... bears not only on
' Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law; J.D. Boston College Law School; B.A.
Haverford College.
1. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
2. Id. at 426.
3. Id. at 436-37.
4. See J. Benjamin King, Clarification and Disruption: The Effect of Gasperini v. Center for
Humanities, Inc. on the Erie Doctrine, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 161, 163-64 (1997); Joseph B. Koc-
zko, Note, Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Incorporated: State Jury Award Controls Supplant
Seventh Amendment Protections, 18 PACE L. REV. 199 (1997).
5. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 462.
6. 356 U.S. 525 (1958) (countervailing federal policy involving the distribution of functions
between judge and juries in the federal courts requires the application of federal law).
7. 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure applies where scope of federal
rule is broad enough even when the application of the federal rule may vary the outcome between
federal and state courts).
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the allocation of trial functions between judge and jury... [;] it also
controls the allocation of authority to review verdicts .... "'
Justice Ginsburg's thinking in Gasperini reflects the state law bi-
ases contributed by Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter to modern judi-
cial federalism, as evidenced in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins9 and
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,"0 respectively. Erie and Guaranty Trust
are viewed by legal scholars not only as the bases for modern judicial
federalism,11 but also as critical to the effort to adapt the state and fed-
eral courts to modern mobile society and commercialism.' 2 The Erie
doctrine remains accepted as axiomatic. 3 The federalist thinking of
Justices Brandeis, Frankfurter, and Ginsburg implicates Jewish his-
torical social experience, and the mystery or riddle of why Justice
Ginsburg applied state law in Gasperini when federal law clearly ap-
plied can be explained by Jewish social experience in Europe and
America.
This article explores the connection between traditional Jewish
localism 4 and the creation of modern American federalism that flows
from the Erie doctrine."' First, the riddle of Gasperini is explored.' 6
Next, the federalist philosophies of Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter
in Erie and Guaranty Trust are discussed.17 Finally, the article ana-
8. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 432 (citation omitted).
9. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
10. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
11. Frank J. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas and
Judicial Conservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 319 (1993).
12. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION:
ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-
CENTURY AMERICA 3 (2000). Erie preserved state law even as the railroads and means of com-
munication created the need for a national law governing interstate transactions. Erie recognized
that the states had a role to play in regulating multistate transactions and business. Justice
Brandeis recognized that the persistence of state courts in developing common law prevented
national legal uniformity. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74. Erie guaranteed that the states maintained a role
in commercial and other regulations as American commerce became more national in scope.
13. See generally John B. Corr, Thoughts on the Vitality of Erie, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1087,
1088 (1992).
14. Traditionally, many Jews have lived in isolated but religiously interconnected local
communities before and after the Fall of the Temple in Jerusalem. Jews have had to adapt to
local conditions while maintaining a universally shared religion. Jewish lawmaking and interpre-
tation were impacted by this attachment to local communities. See infra notes 143-186 and ac-
companying text.
15. Concerning the Erie doctrine, see generally Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And the
New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Not Bad for
Government Work: Does Anyone Else Think the Supreme Court Is Doing a Halfway Decent Job in Its
Erie-HannaJurisprudence? 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 963 (1998); and Gregory Gelfand & How-
ard B. Abrams, Putting Erie on the Right Track, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 937 (1988).
16. See infra part II.
17. See infra part III.
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lyzes how Justices Brandeis, Frankfurter, and Ginsburg, as twentieth-
century American Jews, embody the traditional Jewish minority ex-
perience that, at least in part, was informed by anti-Semitism. 8
II. GASPERINI: CREATING THE RIDDLE
In Gasperini, Justice Ginsburg accommodates both Seventh
Amendment doctrine and Erie concerns about the necessary applica-
tion of state law. Through this accommodation, Justice Ginsburg
avoids taking the next logical step that is implied by her own analysis,
thereby creating a multilayered riddle. Justice Scalia suggests in dis-
sent that applying a federal rule would be a simple solution. Rather
than apply a federal rule, Justice Ginsburg creates an accommodation
intended to further state law interests. This accommodation, though,
has the opposite result, as it defies the New York State Legislature's
intent to create statewide uniformity of legal standards.
A. Facts and Procedural History of Gasperini
William Gasperini served as a journalist covering events in Cen-
tral America. While there, Gasperini photographed wars, politicians,
and scenes from daily life. Upon request, Gasperini supplied the Cen-
ter for Humanities, Inc., with three hundred slide transparencies it
needed to produce an educational video, Conflict in Central America.
The Center utilized over one hundred of the three hundred transpar-
encies that Gasperini provided. At the end of the project, the Center
could not return the transparencies to Gasperini, as it had promised,
because the original transparencies were missing. 9
As a citizen of California," Gasperini brought a diversity action
in United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
against the Center,2' which was incorporated and had its principal
place of business in New York." Gasperini alleged state law causes of
action for breach of contract, conversion, and negligence; the Center
conceded liability. 3 Focusing solely on damages, the jury awarded
Gasperini $450,000 in compensatory damages.24
18. See infra parts IV and V.
19. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 419 (1996).
20. Id. at 419, n.1.
21. Id. at 419.
22. Id. at 419, n.1.
23. Id. at 419.
24. Id. at 419-20.
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The Center moved for a new trial, attacking the jury's verdict for
various reasons including excessiveness. 2' The District Court denied
the motion, and the Center appealed. The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals utilized a New York State statute to review the jury's ver-
dict. 26 The New York State Legislature had standardized judicial re-
view for appeals of the size of jury awards. 27  The New York jury
award review statute provided the following: "In reviewing a money
judgment ... the appellate division shall determine that an award is
excessive or inadequate if it deviates materially from what would be
reasonable compensation. "28 The New York Legislature sought to
contain costly malpractice premiums, especially in the context of
medical and dental malpractice.29
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals applied the New York
standard to the Gasperini case and found that the District Court's ver-
dict violated the New York standard by materially deviating fromwhat is reasonable compensation. 3' The Second Circuit vacated the
judgment of the District Court, ordering a new trial unless Gasperini
agreed to a $100,000 award." Gasperini then petitioned the United
States Supreme Court, and the Court granted certiorari.1
2
Gasperini contended that the New York jury award review stat-
ute is a procedural provision that allocates decisionmaking authority
between judges and juries when making damage awards. Because the
statute is procedural, Gasperini argued, a federal appellate court can-
not give effect to the New York statute without violating the Seventh
Amendment's Re-examination Clause, which provides that "no fact
tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
25. Id. at 420.
26. Id. at 420-21.
27. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW AND RULES § 5501(c) (McKinney 1995).
28. Id. The provision stated:
The appellate division shall review questions of law and questions of fact on an appeal
from a judgment or order of a court of original instance and on an appeal from an or-
der of the supreme court, a county court or an appellate term determining an ap-
peal .... In reviewing a money judgment in an action... in which it is contended
that the award is excessive or inadequate and that a new trial should have been
granted unless a stipulation is entered to a different award, the appellate division shall
determine that an award is excessive or inadequate if it deviates materially from what
would be reasonable compensation.
Id.
29. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 423, n.3.
30. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 66 F.3d 427, 431 (2d Cir. 1995).
31. Id. at 428.
32. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 516 U.S. 1086, 1086 (1996) (order granting cer-
tiorari).
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United States, than according to the rules of the common law."33 The
Center countered that the New York statute's "deviates materially"
standard serves as substantive law that must be applied by federal ap-
pellate courts in diversity actions.34 The United States Supreme Court
utilized an Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins analysis.3"
B. The Supreme Court's Gasperini Opinion
The Supreme Court intertwined a substantive-procedural di-
chotomy analysis with an outcome-determinative analysis.36 The
Court found that the New York jury award review statute was both
substantive and procedural because the statute controlled how much a
plaintiff could obtain and assigned decisionmaking authority to the
New York appellate courts.37
Though the Court found a substantive component or character
to the New York statute, it did not automatically apply the statute un-
der Erie. Instead, the Court utilized the outcome-determinative test
from Guaranty Trust v. York a" to decide whether failure to apply the
New York jury review standard would discriminate against New York
citizens or would cause plaintiffs to choose federal court.39 Using the
outcome-determinative test, the Court found that by ignoring the
New York statute in federal courts, there would be substantial varia-
tions between the outcomes in state and federal courts. The variations
would occur because the New York statute's "deviates materially"
standard requires a more probing review than the "shock the con-
science" standard of federal courts.
40
Once utilizing the outcome-determinative test, the next logical
step for the Gasperini Court would have been to affirm the Second
Circuit's use of the New York jury award review statute. If using the
traditional federal appellate standard to review jury awards creates the
high risk of different outcomes in federal and state courts, federal ap-
33. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 426; U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
34. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 426.
35. Id. at 426-31,436-38.
36. Id. at 426-31. In a substantive-procedural dichotomy analysis, state law applies if the
issue is a substantive law issue, while federal law applies where the issue is a procedural issue.
See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941). In an outcome- determinative analysis, a federal
court in a diversity case must use the law that would assure a similar outcome if the case had
been brought in the state courts of the state where the federal court is located. Guaranty Trust,
326 U.S. at 109.
37. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 426.
38. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
39. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 428.
40. Id. at 430.
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peals courts under Erie and Guaranty Trust should be required to use
the New York standard and not the federal standard. The Gasperini
Court failed to follow that logic. Instead, the Gasperini Court focused
on the Re-examination Clause of the Seventh Amendment.41
Application of the Seventh Amendment to this case would result
in the conclusion that the federal appellate court is not required to ap-
ply the New York statute. Though the Supreme Court in Gasperini
allowed the federal courts of appeal to review federal trial courts' deni-
als of motions to set aside jury verdicts as excessive,42 the Court also
found that the Seventh Amendment allocates trial functions between
judge and jury and controls the power to review jury verdicts.43 The
Gasperini Court relied on Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Coopera-
tive, Inc. ,44 to acknowledge that the federal courts are an independent
court system and that an essential characteristic of that independent
system is the manner in which the system distributes functions be-
tween judges and juries.
41
After recognizing the independent nature of the federal judicial
distribution of functions between judges and juries, the next logical
step for the Gasperini Court would be to apply Byrd and bar the fed-
eral courts of appeal from using the New York jury award review stat-
ute, in spite of the risk of differing outcomes. If the federal courts are
a separate court system, then the federal courts possess the essential
characteristic of distributing decision-making functions between jury
and judge. And because the Seventh Amendment controls the alloca-
tion of functions between juries and judges, the New York statute
should not govern federal practice, whether trial or appellate. The
trial and appellate federal courts, therefore, must determine their own
standards for reviewing excessive jury awards.
The Gasperini Court again failed to follow that logic. Instead,
the Court created a bifurcated legal standard. Because two courts ex-
isted in Gasperini, a federal trial court and federal appellate court, a
choice between New York and federal law did not have to be made.46
The Gasperini Court applied both New York and federal law, because
the federal and New York interests could be accommodated.47 The
federal appeals court would use the traditional "shock the conscience"
41. Id. at 431-36.
42. Id. at 434-36.
43. Id. at 432.
44. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
45. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 432.
46. Id. at 436-37.
47. Id. at 437.
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standard,48 while the federal district court would use the New York
"deviates materially" standard,49 respecting New York's dominant in-
terest. so
C. The Riddle Created by the Gasperini Opinion
The Gasperini Court's accommodation of state and federal law
creates a multifaceted riddle. First, the Court twice neglected to take
the next logical step. If the traditional standard of review of federal
appellate courts in diversity cases causes the probable risk of varying
outcomes between state and federal courts, state law should apply.
And, if the Seventh Amendment and federal judicial policy require
that federal courts develop and apply their own jury review standards,
federal law should apply.
Second, Seventh Amendment law and policy, as constitutionally
based law and policy, would seem to dominate in light of the Suprem-
acy Clause.5 However, Justice Ginsburg's Gasperini opinion de-
scribes New York's interest as dominant.52 As Justice Scalia points
out in his dissent, Justice Ginsburg's application of New York law
contradicts the basic principle that federal trial and appellate courts
properly use federal law to review the size of jury verdicts. " Requir-
ing federal trial judges to do otherwise disrupts the federal system by
allowing state law to govern the relationship between judge and jury in
federal courts.54
Third, the New York statute provides that "[t]he appellate divi-
sion shall determine that an award is excessive or inadequate if it devi-
ates materially. . . . " The New York State Legislature established an
appellate standard to be applied statewide in New York. The appel-
late courts in New York are required to state their reasons for rulings
on the sizes of verdicts, thereby creating a set of norms throughout the
state. 56 Statewide standardization of a legal norm required appellate
court attention. The Gasperini Court turns the New York policy pref-
erence for appellate protection of consistent statewide norms on its
48. Id. at 438-39.
49. Id. at 438.
50. Id. at 437.
51. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
52. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 437.
53. Id. at 448-69 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 462-63.
55. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW AND RULES § 5501(c) (McKinney 1995).
56. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 423-24.
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head by requiring a federal trial court-not a federal appeals court-to
utilize the statutory standard.
Lastly, Justice Scalia points out in his dissent that the question of
which judicial review standard should apply for review of jury awards
can easily be resolved by simply following Rule 59 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.57 Rule 59 states: "[A] new trial may be
granted ... for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore
been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States. '"58
For Justice Scalia, Rule 59 requires the application of federal law be-
cause the existence of a federal rule is a reason, as that term is used in
the Rule.59
Justice Ginsburg creates a multifaceted riddle in Gasperini. The
accommodation of federal and state law is an attempt to balance the
Seventh Amendment with Erie considerations. In making this ac-
commodation, however, she overlooks federal law that could easily re-
solve the problem. As Justice Scalia notes, a federal rule of civil pro-
cedure exists that is on point.6" In addition, Justice Ginsburg
recognizes Seventh Amendment doctrine that mandates the applica-
tion of a federal standard, but instead of applying the federal standard,
Justice Ginsburg applies state law. Application of the New York law
defies the intent of the New York Legislature because its application
requires a trial court to apply a standard that the legislature intended
the state appellate courts to apply in an effort to standardize jury
awards statewide.
Justice Ginsburg takes many extra analytical steps in order to ac-
commodate state law when federal law would have quickly resolved
the problem. But even after taking those steps, she reassigns a state-
created appellate function to trial courts. The reasons why Justice
Ginsburg constructs a blended and complicated federalism structure
that includes state law and accords state policy so much importance,
even while distorting that state policy, reach back to the philosophical
bases of the Erie doctrine and the federalist thinking of Justice Louis
Brandeis and Justice Felix Frankfurter.
57. Id. at 467-68.
58. FED. R. Civ. P. 59.
59. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 467-68.
60. Id. at 468.
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III. FRANKFURTER AND BRANDEIS: THE BASIS OF THE ANSWER TO
THE GASPERINI RIDDLE
A. Justice Frankfurter's Early Law Review Argument in Favor of State
Law
The federalist aspect to Gasperini, as well as the sympathy to
state law reflected in the opinion, are traceable to a law review article
written by Professor Felix Frankfurter in 1928.61 In the article, Frank-
furter asserts that "the proper allocation of authority between United
States and state courts is but part of the perennial concern over the
wise distribution of power between the states and the nation.1
62
Frankfurter argued in favor of strengthening state court jurisdiction
and state power, and also contended that some federally protected
rights would be better protected in state courts. Distribution of juris-
diction depended on the nature of the issue, even where the issue arose
under the constitution and laws of the United States.63 Frankfurter
even argued in favor of curtailing the reach of the federal penal code in
deference to state criminal law, going so far as to enforce federal
criminal law in state tribunals. 64 Generally, Frankfurter would give
jurisdiction to state courts "whenever federal rights arise out of trans-
actions which are dominantly local and readily lend themselves to state
remedies. '65 Further, Frankfurter argued, federal equitable jurisdic-
tion should be limited.66
Frankfurter questioned the continuing need for diversity juris-
diction, finding that "local prejudice has ever so much less to thrive on
than it did when diversity jurisdiction was written into the Constitu-
tion. '67 For Frankfurter, diversity jurisdiction served as a politically
unwise escape hatch for powerful litigants who desired to avoid state
courts and the application of state law.68 Diversity jurisdiction created
unfairness by allowing the nonresidents of a state the choice of two
courts, federal or state, while the residents of a state could choose only
state court.69
61. Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts,
13 CORNELL L. Q. 499 (1928).
62. Id. at 506.
63. Id. at 515.
64. Id. at 516.
65. Id. at 517.
66. Id. at 518.
67. Id. at 521.
68. Id. at 522.
69. Id. at 524.
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Frankfurter expressed special ire with the legal principles and
policies underlying Swift v. Tyson.7" The unfairness of diversity be-
came magnified where, under Swift, the federal courts in a diversity
action were not required to apply state law.71 Frankfurter's critique of
Swift served as an analytical framework for Justice Louis Brandeis'
opinion in Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins, and Justice Frank-
furter's opinion in Guaranty Trust Company v. York.
B. Erie and Guaranty Trust: A Preference for State Law
In Erie and Guaranty Trust, Justices Frankfurter and Brandeis
share a strong commitment to, and sympathy for, state or local law.
In Erie, Tompkins was injured by a passing freight train owned
by the Erie Railroad Company while walking along a railroad right-of-
way." In Guaranty Trust, York received a gift worth $6,000 in notes
issued by the Van Sweringen Corporation. Guaranty Trust served as
the trustee for the note holders with the obligation of enforcing the
rights of those note holders. Around the same time as becoming a
trustee for the note holders, Guaranty Trust also made loans to com-
panies affiliated with and controlled by Van Sweringen. These com-
panies quickly ran into financial problems. Guaranty Trust cooper-
ated with a plan to purchase notes at a discount for Van Sweringen
stock. Because her donor refused to accept the discounted exchange,
York received her gift of notes after the end of note exchange period."3
The tort claim in Erie was brought in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York,74 and the action for
breach of trust in Guaranty Trust was also brought in federal court in
New York.7" The Erie Railroad insisted that Pennsylvania property
and tort law be applied, while Tompkins urged that federal general
common law be applied.76 The District Court in Erie applied federal
law, and the jury awarded Tompkins damages.77 The Court of Ap-
peals affirmed, applying general federal common law. 8
In Guaranty Trust, the issue was whether the equity side of a fed-
eral district court was bound to apply a state statute of limitations or
70. Id. at 524-30; Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1842).
71. Frankfurter, supra note 61, at 524.
72. Erie, 304 U.S. at 69.
73. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 100.
74. Erie, 304 U.S. at 69.
75. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 100-01.
76. Erie, 304 U.S. at 71.
77. Id. at 70.
78. Id.
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whether it could apply federal doctrine. 9 The District Court in Guar-
anty Trust found for the trust company; the Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed, finding that the state statute of limitations did not apply."0
Justice Brandeis delivered the majority opinion in Erie,81 and Jus-
tice Frankfurter delivered the majority opinion in Guaranty Trust. 2 In
those opinions,8" Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter both strongly criti-
cized Swift v. Tyson, just as Frankfurter did in his federalism law re-
view article years earlier.84 In Erie, Justice Brandeis cites to Frank-
furter's article at least four times, along with other scholars and
articles.8" Justice Brandeis adopts Frankfurter's law review analysis in
Erie by clearly laying out the Swift doctrine, writing that Swift "held
that federal courts exercising jurisdiction on the grounds of diversity
of citizens need not, in matters of general jurisprudence, apply the
unwritten law of the state as declared by its highest court .. ,"86 Jus-
tice Brandeis, for the Erie Court, focuses on Black & White Taxicab
& Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co.,87 just as Frankfurter
did in his article.88 To Justice Brandeis, Black & White Taxicab con-
firmed that Swift encouraged corporate manipulation of diversity ju-
risdiction, including forum shopping.
Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter point to Black & White Taxi-
cab as an example of the bankruptcy of the Swift doctrine. Black &
White Taxicab demonstrates how easily a corporate party could move
to another state for the purpose of creating diversity jurisdiction and
utilizing more favorable federal law. Such manipulative forum shop-
ping favors out-of-state litigants who can take advantage of diversity
jurisdiction.89
Justice Brandeis notes in Erie that the Swift doctrine failed to
create uniformity of law because state courts continued to develop
79. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 101.
80. Id. at 100-01.
81. Erie, 304 U.S. at 69.
82. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 99.
83. Erie, 304 U.S. at 71-79; Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 101-02.
84. See Frankfurter, supra note 61, at 524-29.
85. Erie, 304 U.S. at 73-77 nn.6-7 & 20-21.
86. Id. at 71.
87. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518
(1928). In Black & White Taxicab Co., a Kentucky taxicab company sought to serve a railroad
exclusively, but Kentucky common law prevented such a contract. The taxicab company rein-
corporated in Tennessee in order to bring a diversity action against a competitor Kentucky taxi-
cab company to enjoin competition from the competitor taxicab company. Id. at 522-24.
88. Frankfurter, supra note 61, at S27.
89. Erie, 304 U.S. at 73-74.
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their own common law doctrines.9" He also asserts that Swift created
discrimination by noncitizens of states against citizens of states be-
cause "rights enjoyed under the unwritten 'general law' vary according
to whether enforcement was sought in the state or in the federal
court ... The doctrine rendered equal protection in diversity ac-
tions impossible.92 Brandeis found Swift in violation of constitutional
principles that recognize and preserve "the autonomy and independ-
ence of the states-independence in their legislative and independence
in their judicial departments. "93 The Erie Court reversed the Court of
Appeals, requiring that state law be applied.94
Justice Frankfurter, in Guaranty Trust, also criticizes Swift as
creating unfairness by quoting Judge Augustus Hand: "The main
foundation for the criticism of Swift v. Tyson was that a litigant in
cases where federal jurisdiction is based only on diverse citizenship
may obtain a more favorable decision by suing in the United States
courts. "" Although Justice Frankfurter consistently expressed his dis-
like for Swift and seemed glad that Justice Brandeis overruled that case
in Erie,96 he implicitly wrote Guaranty Trust as though a defect existed
in Erie.
Guaranty Trust involved a statute of limitations, and Justice
Frankfurter refused to classify a statute of limitations as either proce-
dural or substantive law.97 Justice Frankfurter implied in Guaranty
Trust that Erie could be read narrowly, requiring application of state
law only where the issue concerned substantive rather than procedural
law. However, he chose not to read Erie so narrowly, writing "Erie R.
Co. v. Tompkins was not an endeavor to formulate scientific legal ter-
minology."9"
Instead of adopting an Erie procedural-substantive law dichot-
omy standard, Justice Frankfurter in Guaranty Trust created an out-
come-determinative test, to be used "where the outcome of the litiga-
tion in the federal court should be substantially the same, so far as
legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried
in a state court." 99 Justice Frankfurter in Guaranty Trust, like Justice
90. Id. at 74.
91. Id. at 74-75.
92. Id. at 75.
93. Id. at 77-78.
94. Id. at 80.
95. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 111.
96. Id. at 101.
97. Id. at 100-01.
98. Id. at 109.
99. Id.
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Brandeis in Erie, favored state law, a position consistent with his 1928
law review article."' For Justice Frankfurter, Erie reflected underlying
public policy that defined the distribution of judicial power between
state and federal courts. 1 ' In Guaranty Trust, Justice Frankfurter
strongly emphasized that the source of substantive rights enforced by
a federal court in a diversity action was the state law,11 2 and a federal
court in a diversity action adjudicating a state right constituted "only
another court of the state."'0 3 Ultimately, the Guaranty Trust Court
reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, finding that the equity
side of a federal court in a diversity case must apply state law, includ-
ing a state statute of limitations." 4
C. Erie and Guaranty Trust: A Preference for Positivism
Justices Frankfurter and Brandeis criticized not only the policy
impacts of Swift, but also, and more importantly, the underlying vi-
sion of the nature of law reflected in Swift. Justice Brandeis outlined
the jurisprudential fallacy of Swift: General federal common law
rested upon an assumption that a transcendental body of law existed
outside of any state but obligatory within the state."0 5 Justice Frank-
furter described this jurisprudence of Swift as conceiving of judge-
made law as a brooding omnipresence of reason, and judicial decisions
serving as merely evidence of that reason. 0 6 This is similar to a defi-
nition of natural law: "In ethics, it consists in practical universal judg-
ments which man himself elicits. These express necessary and obliga-
tory rules of human conduct which have been established by the
"1107author of human nature ....
Justice Brandeis insisted that law fails to exist with a definite au-
thority behind it, and common law exists not generally, but as a result
of the authority of the state where a court decides a common law rule
or principle.' This is very similar to a definition of positive law:
"Law actually and specifically enacted or adopted by proper authority
for the government of an organized jural society."109
100. See notes 61-71 supra and accompanying text.
101. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 109.
102. Id. atll2.
103. Id. at 108.
104. Id. at 112.
105. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79.
106. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 102.
107. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 712-13 (6th ed. 1991).
108. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79.
109. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 107, at 806.
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Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter relied on the thinking of Jus-
tice Holmes to develop their criticisms of natural law and their sup-
port for proactive law. Justice Brandeis referred directly to Justice
Holmes, " ' and Justice Frankfurter referred generally to Justice
Brandeis' jurisprudential analysis in Erie.1' However, much of Justice
Brandeis' and Justice Frankfurter's support for positive law can be
found in Frankfurter's law review article, published a decade before
Erie. In his article, Frankfurter quoted extensively from Justice
Holmes about the problems of natural law and the benefits of positive
law.1
12
Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter supported positive law juris-
prudence. For them, law did not ooze out of the ether. Instead, law
represented the product of a specific sovereign which, in the American
context, came from state governments." 3 In Erie and Guaranty Trust,
the Justices applied state law and emphasized the importance of state
government, legislatures, and courts. Justice Brandeis went as far as to
say that "there is no federal general common law."' 4 For Justices
Brandeis and Frankfurter, the state lawmaking powers and processes
remained sacrosanct. Three generations later, Justice Ginsburg in
Gasperini also emphasized the need to not overlook state law." 5
Justices Brandeis, Frankfurter, and Ginsburg share a need to
emphasize the application of state law. One explanation for the em-
phasis that they place on the application of state law is their Jewish
roots. The next section discusses the development of Jewish localism
and the Jewish culture in which these Justices lived.
IV. EXPLAINING GAsPERINI: THE JEWISH SOCIAL EXPERIENCE
AND AMERICAN LOCALISM
A. An Early History of Jewish Localism
Early in Jewish history, the Jewish community was accorded self-
government, including under the Ptolemaic kings and the early Hel-
lenic Empire. " 6 A Jewish diaspora grew gradually and did not sud-
denly exist as a result of the destruction of Temple in Jerusalem in 70
110. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79.
111. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 101-03.
112. Frankfurter, supra note 61, at 527.
113. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78-79; Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 112.
114. Guaranty Trust, 304 U.S. at 78.
115. See supra notes 36-60, and accompanying text.
116. MAx J. DIMONT, JEWS, GOD, AND HISTORY 84-87 (1994).
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C.E." 7 The destruction of the Temple permanently changed the Jew-
ish religion by eliminating a cultic center, ruining the priesthood lead-
ership, and allowing the rise of nonpriestly religious rabbinic teaching
specialists."' 8 However, the destruction of the Temple made a dias-
pora the way of life for Jews." 9 The Jews had to adapt to and survive
in farflung dispersal, with Jews living in relatively small communities
throughout and beyond the Mediterranean. 2 ° Jewish survival de-
pended on self-governance and the development of communal life and
institutions. 12' Law became the centerpiece of Jewish autonomy and
communal survival.
Rabbinic Judaism centered on the study of the Torah. Through
the synagogical study of the Torah, the rabbis developed the Mishnah,
which served as "a collection of laws covering every field in which the
rabbis had legal competence ... not only ritual law, but also commer-
cial transactions, property, inheritance, legal procedure, and
torts .... 22 The Talmud developed as a legal commentary to the
Mishnah. 123 The Babylonian Talmud became the authoritative source
book for Rabbinic Judaism into the Middle Ages.1 24 The development
of Jewish law was driven by rabbis in the context of Yeshivah dis-
courses and scholarship, 2 ' and the rabbis expounded on the law to
solve problems and to determine which law was authoritative under
what circumstances.
26
Jewish law was flexible and could be amended or interpreted to
cope with a variety of circumstances that arose when a people were
dispersed throughout small and different communities. 127 Jewish law
had to be formulated to meet the needs of each local environment, but
also had to enable all Jews, no matter where they lived, to share uni-
versal values.'28 Ultimately, by the Middle Ages the Talmud was
codified into a specific set of laws called the Shulhan Aruch.
117. RAYMOND P. SCHEINDLIN, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE: FROM
LEGENDARY TIMES TO MODERN STATEHOOD 46-49 (1998). C.E. is an abbreviation for
Common Era or Christian Era. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 332 (Stuart Flexner ed., 2d ed. 1981).
118. SCHEINDLIN, supra note 117, at 51-52.
119. DIMONT, supra note 116, at 110-25.
120. SCHEINDLIN, supra note 117, at 48.
121. DIMONT, supra note 116, at 126-27.
122. SCHEINDLIN, supra note 117, at 56.
123. Id. at 62.
124. Id. at 67.
125. DIMONT, supra note 116, at 170-72.
126. SCHEINDLIN, supra note 117, at 63.
127. DIMONT, supra note 116, at 167-68.
128. Id. at 179-80.
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The Shulhan Aruch allowed the ghettos of the late Middle Ages
and the early enlightenment to maintain self-government.' 29 Overall,
Judaism developed a type of legal federalism, with the local rabbis in-
terpreting and applying law in the context of local circumstances while
the law included within itself universal and unifying values for all Jews
wherever they lived. A good example of the Jewish federalism can be
found in the Islamic world, where local rabbis "functioned as judges
and communal authorities[,] not just as experts in ritual and family
law."' 3° When local rabbis were faced with difficult legal questions,
they directed those questions to regional rabbinic leaders called
gaonim.1
3 1
The Jewish law allowed the Jews to live dispersed in a variety of
circumstances and yet remain a united people. The law allowed and
encouraged Jewish localism because "[t]he latent force behind Tal-
mudism was Jewish self-government. 132  Jews enjoyed varying
amounts of self-governance in a variety of circumstances. The Jews
were accorded what was described as "some measure of autonomy"
and "semiautonomous status."'33  In the Middle Ages in Christian
Europe, the Jews also possessed semiautonomous status. 3" The ex-
periences of the Jews in the Ottoman Empire mirrored those of the
Jews in Christian medieval Europe and the early Islamic world. The
Ottoman Empire left the Jews to govern their own affairs. 135 An ex-
ample of European self-government was the Dutch Jewish community
in the late 1600s where the community organization imposed strict
communal discipline, even where a broader Dutch society fostered tol-
erance.136
B. The Growth of Jewish Localism
This section describes how Jewish localism in medieval Europe
developed from the experience of being ostracized and living in
autonomous, locally governed communities, while maintaining ties
with the local non-Jewish governing establishment. Jews were isolated
in medieval Europe, sometimes by force and sometimes by choice, be-
129. Id. at 184-85.
130. SCHEINDLIN, supra note 117, at 77.
131. Id.
132. DIMONT, supra note 116, at 177.
133. SCHEINDLIN, supra note 117, at 76-77.
134. Id. at 101.
135. Id. at 125.
136. Id. at 160.
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cause they were not accepted as part of the dominant Christian soci-
ety.
In the mid-1500s, the Catholic Church began the process of
ghettoizing the Jews.'37 Ghettoization in Europe not only isolated and
divided the Jews,'38 but also tended to be a localized experience that
was not uniform throughout Europe. However, even where Jews were
not forced to live together, they tended to live and work together in
Jewish quarters of European cities.'39 Christendom through the Mid-
dle Ages had transformed the Jew into "the symbol of the abhorrent
man in Western eyes."' 4 ° The result was Jewish social isolation and
the desire often for Jewish self-isolation. The shtetl in Eastern Europe
provides a good example of Jewish communal life after 1600.
Shtetls were small towns where Jews and non-Jews lived. 4'
Though Jews lived among non-Jews in the shtetls, Jews created their
own self-governing communities. The communities were controlled
by a Kahal, a body of male elders, who "collected taxes, deployed the
community's finances, and adjudicated legal and doctrinal dis-
putes." '142
In the best of traditional Jewish federalism, balancing local Jew-
ish interests with Jewish universalism, 43 the local Kahals in Poland
also organized a national Jewish assembly. This assembly, a type of
nationwide Jewish parliament, dealt with broader communal issues.'44
The Jewish community in Poland possessed autonomy in rela-
tion to the Polish government. 14' The Jews in Poland not only experi-
enced their own communal federalism, but they also experienced a
broader type of federalism in which the Jews were governed by their
own semi-state within the Polish state. Overall, the Polish experience
symbolizes well the historical Jewish social experience.
The diaspora Jews, dispersed over continents and in civilizations,
organized themselves, with the permission of non-Jewish host gov-
ernments, into Jewish states within broader host states. They gov-
erned themselves with Jewish law, which was adaptable by the rabbis
137. SCHEINDLIN, supra note 117, at 155.
138. DIMONT, supra note 116, at 236.
139. Id. at 253-54.
140. Id. at 236.
141. Id. at 257.
142. EVA HOFFMAN, SHTETL: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF A SMALL TOWN AND THE
WORLD OF POLISHJEWS 51-52 (1997).
143. See supra notes 127-36 and accompanying text.
144. HOFFMAN, supra note 142, at 53-55.
145. Id. at 55.
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and community elders to the needs and demands of each community,
and universal in binding the Jews together in one religion.
46
Jewish autonomy and self-governance developed because the
Jews lived for centuries, especially in Europe, as "an alien body in the
midst of a Christian world."' 47 Jews and non-Jews, especially Chris-
tians, failed to share a worldview.'48 In Europe, the Jews faced vio-
lence. "'49 Jewish autonomy was necessary to protect against the hostil-
ity of a wider society. However, self-governance came at a price: the
Jews had to adapt to local non-Jewish political rule. 5 ' Specifically, the
Jews accommodated local political leaders through the politics of com-
plementarity, "whereby the Jews attempted to win protection by sup-
plying local needs."'' Without this protection from the local non-
Jewish power structure, the Jews faced violence, against which they
lacked a defense.1
5 2
Local rulers of locales in Europe invited the Jews to serve them
as clients because the Jews possessed skills as merchants and business
people. This relationship gave Jews a special status in the community
and a direct relationship with local rulers.' The Courtier-rabbis in
Muslim Spain created a similar relationship between the Jewish com-
munity and a local royal court.' During the early Middle Ages in
Germany, the Jews moved from one duchy to another as local politics
required.' In Poland, Jews served, and identified with, the local aris-
tocracy.' 56 The Jews not only developed a strong allegiance to local
control even in the context of universal values, but they also learned
through the necessity of physical survival to play politics with local
power structures.
C. The Jewish American Experience
The Jewish American experience paralleled many aspects of
European and Mediterranean Jewish life. However, America differed
from historical Europe in one sense: the Jews in America were never
146. DIMONT, supra note 116, at 264-65.
147. SCHEINDLIN, supra note 117, at 200.
148. HOFFMAN, supra note 142, at 109.
149. DIMONT, supra note 116, at 244.
150. Ruth R. Wisse, The Brilliant Failure of Jewish Foreign Policy, 10 AZURE: IDEAS OF
THE JEWISH NATION 118, 126 (2001).
151. Id. at 128-29.
152. Id. at 130.
153. SCHEINDLIN, supra note 117, at 99-100.
154. Id. at 83-84.
155. DIMONT, supra note 116, at 248.
156. HOFFMAN, supra note 142, at 50.
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formally restricted from participating in American society. In Amer-
ica, Jews had the opportunity to integrate into the American social
system."5 7 Even in America, where no formal restrictions existed, Jews
often lived and worked together, retaining the tradition of self-
governance and local control.
1. Jewish Settlement and Societal Structure in the United States
At the very beginning of Jewish settlement in America in the
1650s, the Jewish immigrants to New Amsterdam settled close to each
other in a neighborhood. 5 ' The Puritans considered Jews to be out-
siders."5 9 In the mid-1800s, Jews faced social exclusion because they
were considered to be different. 6 ° Even upper-class Jews faced social
segregation. As a result, Jews tended to live together, often in re-
sponse to their exclusion.16' When the large flow of Jewish immigra-
tion occurred in the late 1800s, Eastern Europeans came to America
with a feeling of being separate from non-Jews. 62 That sense of sepa-
rateness could only be magnified by growing anti-Semitism in the late
1800s and early 1900s.
163
Centuries of Jewish social ostracism, isolation, and self-
governance resulted in the focused settlement of Jews in only a few ar-
eas of America. Although by the late 1920s Jews lived in almost ten
thousand incorporated and unincorporated locations in the United
States, 161 most Jews immigrated to only a few major American cities. 1
Even early in American history, Jews tended to live in the new coun-
try's few cities.'66 By the late 18 00 s, a large number of Jews lived in
urban ghettos such as the Lower East Side of Manhattan. 167 Around
the turn of the twentieth century, Jewish immigrants "made their way
into... Philadelphia, Boston, Detroit, Cleveland, Chicago, but the
majority remained in New York.' 1
6
By the end of the 1920s, when Felix Frankfurter's article sup-
porting the strengthening of state law was published, the Jewish popu-
157. SCHEINDLIN, supra note 117, at 196.
158. ARTHUR HERTZBERG, THE JEWS IN AMERICA 12 (1997).
159. Id. at 32-33.
160. Id. at 103-04.
161. Id. at 126-27.
162. Id. at 158-59.
163. HERTZBERG, supra note 158, at 165-67, 176-79.
164. THE AMERICAN JEWISH YEARBOOK 5690, 305 (1929).
165. HERTZBERG, supra note 158, at 192.
166. Id. at 46.
167. Id. at 160-61.
168. DIMONT, supra note 116, at 373-74.
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lation in America was concentrated in a few states and cities. In the
late 1920s, 90 percent of American Jewry lived in the Northeast, East
North Central, and West North Central regions of the United
States.169 In 1927, over 4,200,000 Jews lived in the United States, and
1,900,000, or 45 percent, lived in New York State, 171 while 1,765,000
Jews lived in New York City. 171 Over 3,200,000 Jews lived in Con-
necticut, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York,
Ohio, and Pennsylvania. 172 That figure represents over three quarters
of the Jews living in America in 1927. Large Jewish population cen-
ters included Baltimore with 68,000 Jews, Boston with 90,000, Chi-
cago with 325,000, Detroit with 75,000, Newark with 65,000, Phila-
delphia with 270,000, and St. Louis with 50,000.173
The urban centers of American Jewry developed a community
structure to serve the Jewish community's social and economic needs.
Early in American history, Jews banded together to create social or-
ganizations. 174 In the 1880s and 1890s, American Jews created a net-
work of charitable and community service organizations. 17 These or-
ganizations reflected "a very old Jewish tradition which had been
transplanted unimpaired from Europe."' 76 Anti-Semitism, social ex-
clusion, and centuries of local autonomy in Europe and the Middle
East allowed the American Jewish community to create their own cit-
ies and towns within cities and towns. The Lower East Side of Man-
hattan, for a period around the turn of the twentieth century, exempli-
fied a Jewish city-within-a-city. 177 Eventually, Jews migrated to other
centers in New York, including the Upper West Side of Manhattan,
Brooklyn, and the Bronx.
178
2. The Jewish American Experiences of Justices Brandeis,
Frankfurter, and Ginsburg
Justices Frankfurter and Brandeis lived, and Justice Ginsburg
grew up, during an era in which Jewish localism prevailed, and all
169. AMERICAN JEWISH YEARBOOK, supra note 164, at 305.
170. Id. at 302.
171. Id. at 309.
172. Id. at 302.
173. Id. at 307-09.
174. HERTZBERG, supra note 158, at 101-02.
175. Id. at 170-71.
176. Id. at 171.
177. Id. at 142-43, 160-61.
178. Id. at 237-38.
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three Justices were or are Jewish.'79 The Jews tended to live in discrete
American communities that provided social and educational services
to members of the communities. Jewish communities in large Ameri-
can cities were cities within cities.
Justice Frankfurter grew up in the Lower East Side of Manhat-
tan, where he became "Americanized.""18 Justice Ginsburg grew up in
Brooklyn, one of the relatively new Jewish centers in New York. 8'
Justice Brandeis grew up in Louisville, Kentucky,182 which by 1927
had a Jewish population of over 12,000.' However, he practiced law
for more than two decades in Boston, Massachusetts, one of the major
Jewish population centers.'
84
Justices Frankfurter and Brandeis lived through an era when
Jewishness meant social separation and social federalism in which Jews
were localized within the broader American society. Justice Brandeis
was born to Jewish Austro-Hungarian immigrants in Louisville, Ken-
tucky. 5  The Brandeis family was not religious, but the family also
did not move away from Judaism.'86 Though Justice Brandeis did not
practice Judaism in a religious sense, Judaism and Judaic values influ-
enced his personal values, especially his commitment to social wel-
fare.'87 He identified as a Jew and participated in Jewish causes, espe-
cially Zionism. 88
Justice Brandeis worked as an attorney in Boston. Though he in-
tegrated well into the Boston social structure, 189 he remained aware of
anti-Semitism in Boston and at Harvard. 9 ' His nomination to the Su-
preme Court encountered anti-Semitic opposition. 9' In death, Justice
Brandeis was eulogized as goaded by morality, which served as a "He-
braic gift."' 92
179. ROBERT A. BURT, Two JEWISH JUSTICES: OUTCASTS IN THE PROMISED LAND 2
(1988); see also Malvina Halberstam, Ruth Bader Ginsburg: The First Jewish Woman on the United
States Supreme Court, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1441, at 1441 (1998).
180. LEONARD BAKER, BRANDEIS AND FRANKFURTER: A DUAL BIOGRAPHY 42 (1986).
181. Halberstam, supra note 179, at 1443-44.
182. BAKER, supra note 180, at 21-22.
183. AMERICAN JEWISH YEARBOOK, supra note 164, at 302.
184. BAKER, supra note 180, at 26-27.
185. Id. at 18-20.
186. Id. at 21-22.
187. Id. at 35.
188. Id. at 70-71, 73-75. Zionism is a political-social movement that aims to reconstitute
the Jewish people as a nation-state by establishing a Jewish state in Palestine. SCHEINDLIN, su-
pra note 117, at 143.
189. BAKER, supra note 180, at 71.
190. Id. at 221.
191. Id. at 116.
192. Id. at 373.
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Justice Frankfurter arrived as a twelve-year-old in the United
States in 1894, having lived up to that point in the center of Vienna's
Jewish ghetto.'93 Like many Jewish immigrants of the period, he lived
with his family in the Lower East Side of Manhattan.'94 He attended
school and college in Manhattan, and worked for the New York City
Tenement House Department. 9 ' Though Justice Frankfurter prac-
ticed Judaism in his youth, he did not do so in adulthood.' Like
Brandeis, he was an active Zionist.'97 Justice Frankfurter faced anti-
Semitism in his employment as a law professor at Harvard,'98 and like
Brandeis, he faced anti-Semitic opposition when nominated to the Su-
preme Court.'99
Robert A. Burt described Jewishness as "distinctively associated
with outsider status, with homelessness, for both Brandeis and Frank-
furter."2 ° Justice Brandeis accepted his outsider status and would
probably not attribute it himself to anti-Semitism, but he remained
aware of the fact that centuries of anti-Semitism toughened him to
hardships, social antagonism, and ostracism.2"' Though he fashioned
himself as an assimilated American insider, Justice Brandeis still re-
mained an outsider as a result of anti-Semitism and other internal and
external isolating circumstances.2 2
Burt based much of his thinking about the marginal social status
of Justices Frankfurter and Brandeis on Hannah Arendt's insights on
the Jewish experience in Europe. For Arendt, Jews played the roles of
perpetual outsiders in Europe.20 3 Burt saw Justices Frankfurter and
Brandeis playing that same Jewish social role in America.0 4
Like Justice Brandeis, Justice Ginsburg was born in America to
Jewish immigrants. Her parents' families had come from Russia and
193. Id. at 41.
194. Id. at 41-42.
195. BAKER, supra note 180, at 43.
196. Id. at 76.
197. Id. at 77.
198. Id. at 220-22.
199. Id. at 366.
200. BURT, supranote 179, at 3.
201. Id. at 33-35.
202. Id. at 48-49, 52-53, 59.
203. Id. at 62-63. Arendt traced the history of Jewish assimilation in Europe, demonstrat-
ing that even as Jews became recognized as citizens of states and emancipated from lower social
status, Jews were not fully accepted as members of society. Jews assumed an insider/outsider
status in which they were citizens but not fully accepted as equals. HANNAH ARENDT, THE
ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 56-68 (1958). The American Jewish immigrant experience
reflects that earlier European experience in which educated, socially prominent Jews were in-
cluded as citizens but still not fully accepted socially.
204. Id. at 62-64.
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Poland. She grew up during the 1930s in one of the major Jewish local
centers-Brooklyn, New York2° --when American anti-Semitism was
at its height. 26 As an adult she served as a member of national Jewish
communal groups.2 7  Though the status of Jews in America has
changed during the past sixty years with the rise of social assimila-
tion,20t Justice Ginsburg grew up in an era when Jews were separate. 9
The New York area where Ginsburg grew up still remains home to
almost one-third of American Jews.21°
Justice Ginsburg is not a religiously observant Jew, but she re-
mains conscious of her Jewishness.2 1 Born in 1933,212 Justice Gins-
burg experienced some of the same anti-Semitic feeling expressed
when Justice Frankfurter was nominated to be an associate Justice of
the Supreme Court in the late 1930s. 21 1 Justice Ginsburg reported at
her Supreme Court nomination confirmation hearing that she was very
aware of anti-Semitism in her childhood. For example, she recalled
memories of a sign that read, "No Dogs or Jews Allowed.
214
3. Jewish American Involvement in Politics
Even though, or perhaps because, Jewish populations concen-
trated in localized areas, Jews sought to play a role in American poli-
tics. In the American context, Jewish involvement in lawmaking in-
cluded participation in the political process.
As Jews growing up in Jewish communities and involving them-
selves in Jewish concerns and causes, Justices Brandeis, Frankfurter,
and Ginsburg experienced the accumulated history of Jewish social
life.215 They grew up and remained part of a social structure that de-
veloped discreetly over many centuries. That social structure of the
Jewish community traditionally valued local autonomy.
205. Halberstam, supra note 179, at 1443.
206. HERTZBERG, supra note 158, at 274-75.
207. Halberstam, supra note 179, at 1442.
208. See generally ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE VANISHING AMERICAN JEW: IN
SEARCH OF JEWISH IDENTITY FOR THE NEXT CENTURY (1997); SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET &
EARL RAAB, JEWS AND THE NEW AMERICAN SCENE (1995); and SAMUEL C. HELIMAN,
PORTRAIT OF AMERICAN JEWS: THE LAST HALF OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1995).
209. Halberstam, supra note 179, at 1441-42.
210. THE JEWISH COMMUNITIES OF THE WORLD, 1998-1999, 30 (1998).
211. Halberstam, supra note 179, at 1441-42.
212. Id. at 1443.
213. BAKER, supra note 180, at 366.
214. Halberstam, supra note 179, at 1441-42.
215. BAKER, supra note 180, at 21-22, 40-43; Halberstam, supra note 179, at 1442.
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Though Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter participated as advi-
sors to presidents on a national scale,216 they also became involved
with local political change217 and Jewish communal causes.21' Their
participation reflected a broader Jewish involvement with politics. By
the mid-1850s, Jews held political offices in New York City's Tam-
many Hall.219 By 1910, the Jews had gained local power in specific
states such as New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Ohio. 220
Justice Brandeis did not conceptualize Jewish political and policy
influence in national terms. Instead, he communicated about Jewish
local influence that could create nationwide impact. He applied this
concept of emerging local Jewish power to impact presidential elec-
toral politics in 1930 when he met the British Ambassador to protest
British inaction relating to the Jewish homeland in Palestine. Justice
Brandeis warned the British Ambassador that Jewish political power
in New York would strain American relations with England. He
communicated to the ambassador that "because of New York having
then the largest number of electoral votes in a presidential election,
Jews had an impact on the selection of an American President dispro-
portionate to their actual numbers in the United States."22'
D. Natural Law as the Insiders' Law
Justices Frankfurter and Brandeis rejected natural law as a model
for the development of law. Instead, they adopted positivist views to-
ward the development of law. Their Jewishness, and especially their
sense of existing as outsiders in a Christian-dominated culture, com-
pelled them to reject natural law. The attitudes of Frankfurter and
Brandeis toward the implied natural law basis of Swift v. Tyson dem-
onstrate their American-outsider localist viewpoints. For them, Swift
rested upon a jurisprudential assumption that there is a transcendental
body of law outside of each state that still creates obligations within
each state.222 In Swift and the cases that followed it, the law was seen
as a brooding omnipresence of reason, which judges were free to ascer-
tain. The law was out there as a natural phenomenon to be under-
stood.223 Justices Frankfurter and Brandeis adopted a Holmesian posi-
216. BAKER, supra note 180, at 81-96, 275-318.
217. Id. at 45-47, 257-67.
218. Id. at 75-80; Halberstam, supra note 179, at 1442.
219. HERTZBERG, supra note 158, at 96-97.
220. Id. at 180.
221. BAKER, supra note 180, at 340.
222. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938).
223. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 102 (1945).
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tivist view of the nature of law and the development of law. 2 '4 For
them, law was not law generally, but existed by authority of the state
where that law was developed. Law only existed because of a definite
authority. 25 Hence, Justice Frankfurter could write: "The source of
substantive rights enforced by a federal court under diversity jurisdic-
tion is the law of the state. Whenever that law is authoritatively de-
clared by a state ... such law ought to govern in litigation founded on
that law.
226
That Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter would adopt Holmes'
skeptical view of natural law is no surprise. Natural law reflects the
dominant Christian culture of Europe and America. 227 Natural law is
universal, divine, unwritten, eternal, and immutable. 228 Natural law
upholds the very nature of what is good in creation: common right
grasped by reason.229 Natural law is a form of divine law emanating
from G-d embedded in the Christian Gospel, representing "the gen-
eral moral principles which God has implanted in human nature. "230
Natural law is grounded in Christian Scripture.2" During the
Middle Ages, Roman natural law was adapted to the teachings of
Christianity, becoming part of Catholic canon law.232 The Catholic
view of the divine Christian nature of natural law continued into the
twentieth century. 233 Early Protestants believed in the divine nature of
natural law as well. 234 Natural law has a strong Christian influence,
relating general moral principles to the Christian Gospel. As a result,
224. Frankfurter, supra note 61, at 527-28. Holmes scoffed at the idea that humans could
discern a universal law. For him, law came out of the pressures of human experience, often re-
flecting majoritarian and elite interests. What seemed to be a universal norm really reflected lim-
ited human consciousness of what is right and important. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural
Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1919).
225. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79.
226. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 112.
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the dominant Christian culture of Europe and America is reflected in
natural law.235
Because it represents Christianity and therefore the dominant
culture, natural law does not mesh well with Jewish legal tradition.
Natural law simply exists. It is there, whether it comes out of nature,
or was placed into existence by G-d.236 Lawmaking is incomplete in
the natural law context because no tangible, definable lawmaker and
no specific textual law exist. Even if G-d, at some unknown points in
time and space, places natural law into existence, the law fails to pos-
sess a certain defined shape. The law still must be discerned from an
intangible, vague source. With natural law, G-d works only indirectly
providing humans with law, and law is not recognized as a response to
people's day-to-day needs.
In contrast to natural law, Jewish law did not develop vaguely or
generally. Jewish law exists partially as the result of a tangible, divine
event in which people played a role-namely, the receipt of the Ten
Commandments. As one expert in natural law said, Jews "[w]ho re-
ject [natural law] do so on grounds that Torah is divine revelation." '237
G-d gave Moses the Ten Commandments,238 and Moses gave the Jew-
ish people the Ten Commandments and other Jewish law. 3' The Ten
Commandments represent very specific legal commandments that im-
pact people directly on a day-to-day basis.
Unlike natural law, Jewish law has a purposeful human evolu-
tion, connected to community and individual needs and protections.
This style of lawmaking requires that the law possess a certainty as to
its source and content. Jewish law developed over centuries as hu-
mans interpreted and applied G-d's original Ten Commandments in
the context of local needs.24 Jewish law can be traced from the Torah
to the Talmud to the Shulhan Aruch.24'
Unlike natural law, Jewish law is not based on vague, universal
values. The difference between Christian legal development and Jew-
ish legal development is the difference between "[a] supranational
community focused on a common faith rather than on a common his-
tory and on a legislated way of life." '242 Justices Frankfurter and
235. See generally BURT, supra note 179, at 62-63; DIMONT, supra note 116, at 149-60,
WISTRICH, supra note 227, at 13-42, and MARTY, supra note 227.
236. HAINES, supra note 228, at 6-17.
237. BUDZISZEWSKI, supra note 231, at 202.
238. Exodus 20:1-17.
239. DIMONT, supra note 116, at 38.
240. SCHEINDLIN, supra note 117, at 51-69.
241. Id. at 62-63.
242. Id. at 60.
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Brandeis latched onto a Holmesian view of legal development that
paralleled traditional Jewish legal development. For them, the law is
developed in a tangible context and by constituted authority, which, in
America, is held by the sovereign states.
V. RESOLVING THE GASPERINI RIDDLE: THE EXPERIENCES OF
JEWISH LOCALISM
The lives of Justices Frankfurter and Brandeis, influenced by the
communities in which they lived and worked, explain their commit-
ment to localism. Life was lived in the local community, and law
flowed from the life of the local community. For centuries, Jews had
lived in a federal system, as people dispersed into localized communi-
ties among larger cities, states, nations, and cultures. Law served as
the binding force of that localism and federalism.244
The Jews lived as aliens in a variety of societies, and functioned
as a sub-society within these societies.24 5 For Jews, separate and local
legal systems, unified by universal principles, were the norm. This
explains why, almost sixty years after Justice Brandeis wrote the Erie
opinion, and almost seventy years after Justice Frankfurter wrote his
law review article praising state law, Justice Ginsburg applied state law
in Gasperini. She applied state law notwithstanding the logic that
commended federal law and the public policies underlying the Seventh
Amendment.246
Jewish Justices find it hard to move away from state law as the
basic law that regulates daily life. For these Justices, daily life occurs
in the tangible confines of the local community. People's day-to-day
legal needs must be met within these local communities. Where Jews
in America chose to live in proximity to each other, they could,
through the democratic process, influence this concrete lawmaking
process.
This lawmaking behavior reflects centuries of Jewish lawmaking
and the Jewish social existence of living in isolation among neighbors.
Even then, Jews as a community tried to influence the communities
surrounding them, while developing their own legal system that al-
lowed them to remain Jewish and adapt to local circumstances. Jus-
tices Brandeis, Frankfurter, and Ginsburg reflected a Jewish tradition
that prized local lawmaking as a longstanding tradition, and Gasperini
243. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79; Frankfurter, supra note 61, at 527-28.
244. DIMONT, supra note 116, at 19.
245. SCHEINDLIN, supra note 117, at 199-200.
246. See supra notes 36-60 and accompanying text.
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is a result and example of that tradition, translated into the context of
modern American federalism.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE JEWISH CONTRIBUTION TO AMERICAN
FEDERALISM
Justice Ginsburg, in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, applies
state law even in the face of countervailing federal policy.247 Justice
Ginsburg goes so far as to lodge the standard of review intended for a
state appellate court in a federal district court in order to assure the
application of "New York's dominant interest. "248 In her determina-
tion to apply state law, Justice Ginsburg reflects a long Jewish tradi-
tion of commitment to localism.2 41 She follows in the footsteps of Jus-
tices Brandeis and Frankfurter, who supported the application of state
law.
250
Those people, corporations, and political forces in America that
prefer the application of state law to the application of federal law
should be grateful to Jewish social and legal experience. Modern fed-
eralism, as developed by Erie, Guaranty Trust, and Gasperini, is a re-
sult of the contributions of American Jews. Just as the Protestant ex-
perience in Europe and Virginia helped to fashion modern
Establishment Clause legal principles,2 5' the Jewish experience in
Europe, the Mediterranean, and America helped to fashion modern
American federalism. Justice Brandeis referred with approval to Jus-
tice Field's words: "There stands ... the constitution of the United
States which recognizes and preserves the autonomy and independ-
ence of the States. ,,2." Almost sixty years later, Justice Ginsburg
sought to preserve state autonomy, respecting "New York's dominant
interest."
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